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Inverse Dynamic Games Based on Maximum
Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning
Jairo Inga, Esther Bischoff, Florian Ko¨pf, and So¨ren Hohmann
Abstract—We consider the inverse problem of dynamic games,
where cost function parameters are sought which explain ob-
served behavior of interacting players. Maximum entropy inverse
reinforcement learning is extended to the N-player case in order
to solve inverse dynamic games with continuous-valued state and
control spaces. We present methods for identification of cost
function parameters from observed data which correspond to
(i) a Pareto efficient solution, (ii) an open-loop Nash equilibrium
or (iii) a feedback Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we give results
on the unbiasedness of the estimation of cost function parameters
for each arising class of inverse dynamic game. The applicability
of the methods is demonstrated with simulation examples of a
nonlinear and a linear-quadratic dynamic game.
Index Terms—Game theory, inverse dynamic games, inverse
reinforcement learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic game theory provides a useful mathematical tool
for describing the behavior or decision making of multiple
agents interacting with each other. It has been succesfully
applied in numerous fields including biology [1], economics
[2], [3] and automatic control. Within the control community,
dynamic games have been studied and applied in the context
of driver assistance systems [4], multi-agent collision avoid-
ance [5] and power system control [6]. In particular, several
techniques for finding the optimal controls or decisions of
each player based on known objectives have been thouroughly
analyzed and applied.
Recent years have seen a growing interest in the inverse
problem of dynamic games, where the objectives modeled
by cost or utility functions of each player are sought. This
problem emerges when it is not possible to model objectives
directly and it is desired to identify them based on previously
observed actions of interacting players. These actions are
typically assumed to correspond to a game equilibrium [1],
[3], [7]–[14]. In this way, a general robust and transferable
model (cf. [15]) of one or several agents in a multi-agent
scenario can be obtained, e.g. human behavior in haptic
dyad interaction [16] or bird collision avoidance behavior
towards the design of unmanned aerial vehicle controllers [1].
This extends the learning by demonstration paradigm to the
multi-player case [17]. Inspired by similar approaches in the
single-agent scenario, also known as inverse optimal control,
inverse dynamic game methods based on conditions for Nash
equilibria have been proposed, e.g. for zero-sum games [7]
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or non-zero-sum two-player scenarios [8]. Recent results in
[9]–[11] show first extensions to a general N-player case.
The single-player problem has also been examined in the
field of computer science, where various so-called inverse
reinforcement learning (IRL) methods have been proposed
(e.g. [18], [19]). Their focus is the identification of a cost
function which may not be equal to the original one, but
is able to explain observed trajectories. In the last years,
some effort has been made to extend these techniques to
a multiplayer setting. Many of these extensions consider a
scenario where one global cost function is sought (e.g. of
a central controller) which can describe the behavior of all
agents [20], [21] or a scenario where all agents have the
same reward [22]. These approaches are therefore related
to cooperative dynamic games, where the players have an
individual objective function but can cooperate in order to
improve their performance1. As for non-cooperative dynamic
games, some IRL-based methods have been proposed, e.g.
[12], [13]. Nevertheless, all aforementioned IRL methods are
based on a Markov Decision Process (MDP) and are limited
to discrete-valued and finite control and state spaces. First
endeavours of extending IRL methods to continuous-valued
control and state spaces build upon the work in [24] where
the principle of maximum entropy (MaxEnt) [25] was applied
in a single-player IRL setting.
Existing work in a multiplayer case includes [26] and [27],
where MaxEnt distributions are also considered. These papers
as well as previous work in the single-player case [28]–
[30] show the potential of MaxEnt IRL for real applications.
However, the theoretical foundation of MaxEnt IRL in a
multiplayer scenario has not been developed yet, especially
in the case of continuous-valued state and control spaces. The
latter is crucial to avoid the curse of dimensionality which
would arise in many applications if discrete state and action
spaces were assumed.
In this paper, we extend MaxEnt IRL to N-player in-
verse dynamic games with continuous-valued and infinite
state and control spaces. We provide methods for identify-
ing cost function parameters of one or several players in
a dynamic game for three different solution concepts: (i)
Pareto efficient solutions in cooperative games and (ii) open-
loop and (iii) feedback Nash equilibrium solutions in non-
cooperative games. Our approach for general N-player inverse
non-cooperative dynamic games extends existing results in
a single [31] and two-player case [14], where only linear-
1Both these state-of-the-art approaches and this paper consider cooperative
yet not coalitional games, where several groups of players may build coalitions
to act non-cooperatively with respect to other ones [23].
2quadratic dynamic games with feedback Nash equilibrium
solutions were considered. A further contribution of this paper
are theoretical results which prove the unbiasedness of the
estimation of the cost function parameters for each presented
inverse dynamic game method.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we define
the general problem of inverse dynamic games. Then, the ap-
plication of the principle of maximum entropy to an N-player
dynamic game is shown in Section III. A method for cost
function parameter identification in cooperative games with
Pareto efficient solutions is given in Section IV. Aftwerwards,
in Section V we propose an approach for non-cooperative
inverse dynamic games with the open-loop and feedback Nash
equilibrium solution concepts. The methods are illustrated with
simulations in Section VI before presenting conclusions in
Section VII.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Consider a dynamic game with N players simultaneously
controlling a (potentially time-variant) discrete-time system
with the dynamics
x(k+1) = f (k)(x(k),u
(k)
1 ,u
(k)
2 , . . . ,u
(k)
N ) (1)
with the state values x(k) ∈ Rn and the control values
u
(k)
i ∈ R
mi , for all players i ∈ {1, . . . , N} =: P ⊂ N+
and for all time steps k ∈ {1, . . . , kE} =: K ⊂ N
+. The initial
state x(1) = x1 is assumed to be known. The function f
(k) is
continuously differentiable with respect to all of its arguments
∀ k ∈ K. Each player i ∈ Pminimizes his individual cost func-
tion Ji by applying a sequence of control values u
(k)
i , ∀k ∈ K.
In this paper, we consider a widely used structure of the cost
function which consists of a linear combination of pi ∈ N
+
known features (cf. [9] and references therein), i.e.
Ji = −
kE∑
k=1
θ⊤i ηi
(
x(k),u
(k)
1 . . . . ,u
(k)
N
)
, (2)
where ηi contains all pi features of player i and θi ∈ R
pi
represents the vector of player i’s individual parameters. The
features (ηi)q (x
(k),u
(k)
1 , . . . ,u
(k)
N ), q ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, of each
player are assumed to be continuously differentiable with
respect to all of their arguments for all k ∈ K.
Let x ∈ RnkE and ui ∈ R
mikE , i ∈ P, denote vectors
containing all values of the system state x(k) and the control
values u
(k)
i of player i ∈ P for all time steps k ∈ K,
respectively. With these, we define the following set:
Definition 1. A trajectory ζ := {x,u1, . . . ,uN} is a set
containing the values of the system state x and the controls
ui of all players i ∈ P which are feasible with respect to (1).
Observed trajectories are assumed to be generated by
p (ζ) which denotes a probability density function (PDF)
over all possible trajectories ζ. We assume that nt ∈ N
observations are available in the form of the observed
trajectories ζ˜ := {x˜, u˜1, . . . , u˜N} which belong to the set
D := {ζ˜1, . . . , ζ˜nt}. Each of these shall represent a solution of
a dynamic game with cost functions Ji parameterized by the
unknown parameters θ∗i , ∀ i ∈ P. In the course of this paper,
the solution will correspond to either Pareto efficient solutions,
open-loop Nash or feedback Nash equilibrium solutions.
A key value in IRL methods is the feature count, which we
introduce in the following.
Definition 2. The feature count µi (ζ) ∈ R
pi of a player i ∈ P
is defined as a vector containing the accumulated values of
the features along a trajectory ζ, i.e.
µi (ζ) =
kE∑
k=1
ηi
(
x(k),u
(k)
1 , . . . ,u
(k)
N
)
, (3)
with x(k),u
(k)
i ∈ ζ , ∀ i ∈ P, k ∈ K.
Using the feature counts µi (ζ) and (2), the costs along a
trajectory ζ for any player i ∈ P can be rewritten as
Ji (ζ, θi) = −θ
⊤
i µi (ζ) . (4)
In the following, p (ζ| θ1:N ) represents the probability density
of a trajectory ζ which depends on the parameters θ1, . . . , θN
of each player i ∈ P.
An inverse dynamic game with IRL is defined as follows.
Problem 1. Find parameters θˆi, ∀ i ∈ P, such that the ex-
pected costs of a trajectory sampled from the resulting PDF
p(ζ| θˆ1:N) corresponds for each player to the expected costs
of a trajectory sampled from the PDF p (ζ| θ∗1:N), i.e.
Ep( ζ|θˆ1:N) {Ji (ζ, θ
∗
i )}
!
= Ep( ζ|θ∗1:N)
{Ji (ζ, θ
∗
i )} , (5)
for all i ∈ P.
The requirement (5) arises from the demand of obtaining
for each player a cost function that results in an individual
performance as good as the observed one, where the perfor-
mance is measured with respect to each player’s unknown
true cost function. Without further assumptions, Problem 1
is inherently ill-posed. This ill-posedness may be resolved
by applying the principle of maximum entropy. In addition,
including the knowledge of which solution concept lies at
hand is necessary for the solution of an inverse dynamic game.
These aspects shall be discussed in the next sections.
III. MAXIMUM ENTROPY FOR INVERSE DYNAMIC GAMES
In this section, we apply the principle of maximum entropy
to obtain a PDF which shall serve as a basis for identifying
cost function parameters in N -player inverse dynamic games.
This principle leads to the “least biased estimate possible
on the given information” [25], where the information lies
in the form of known moment constraints.2 In order to to
state a relationship between observed trajectories ζ˜ and the
expectation (first moment) of the observed trajectory feature
count generated by the PDF p (ζ| θ∗1:N) which generated them,
we make the following assumption.
2This is illustrated e.g. by the fact that the distribution which maximizes
the entropy with the constraints of fixed and known expectation and variance
is the Gaussian distribution. Furthermore, the maximum entropy distribution
where no constraints are included is the uniform distribution [32, Section
12.2].
3Assumption 1. The feature count along the observed trajec-
tories in D represents the expectation of the feature count
Ep( ζ|θ∗1:N)
{µi (ζ)} based on the PDF p (ζ| θ
∗
1:N) which
results from the original cost function parameters, i.e.
Ep( ζ|θ∗1:N)
{µi (ζ)} =
1
nt
nt∑
l=1
µi(ζ˜l) =: µ˜i, (6)
where µi(ζ˜l) denotes the feature count of the observed trajec-
tory ζ˜l, l ∈ {1, ..., nt}.
Assumption 1 implies that the observations are representa-
tive of the population consisting of all possible trajectories
which can be generated from the PDF p(ζ| θ∗1:N ). As no
further information is available, the sample mean is used as
an estimate for the expectation of the feature count.
Lemma 1. Let the expectation of the feature count be equal
for both the PDFs p(ζ| θˆ1:N) and p (ζ| θ
∗
1:N), i.e.
Ep( ζ|θˆ1:N) {µi (ζ)} = Ep( ζ|θ∗1:N)
{µi (ζ)} , (7)
for each player i ∈ P. Then, for any parameters θ∗i with
‖θ∗i ‖2 <∞, (5) is fulfilled.
Proof: The proof is analogous to the one-player case [18].
Lemma 1 represents the principle of matching feature ex-
pectations for all players. This principle was introduced in [18]
and used as a basis for numerous single-player IRL methods.
Since Problem 1 implies (5), by the results of Lemma 1 and
using Assumption 1 we require
Ep( ζ|θˆ1:N) {µi (ζ)} = µ˜i, ∀i ∈ P. (8)
Our aim is to find a PDF p (ζ| θ1:N ) which represents the
probability of trajectories ζ as a function of the parameters
θ1, . . . , θN , yet considering (8) as only a-priori knowledge.
Since this condition does not lead to a unique solution for
the PDF, the principle of maximum entropy is applied. The
following lemma states the PDF which maximizes the entropy
within the framework of inverse dynamic games.
Lemma 2. The unique maximum entropy PDF under the
constraints defined by (8) is given by
p (ζ| θ1:N) =
exp
(∑N
i=1 θ
⊤
i µi (ζ)
)
∫
∀ζ
exp
(∑N
i=1 θ
⊤
i µi (ζ)
)
dζ
. (9)
Proof: The lemma can be proved using a calculus-based
approach analogously to [32, Section 12.1].
In order to solve an inverse dynamic game based on the
derived PDF, the knowledge of the underlying solution concept
becomes necessary. The following section tackles this problem
for cooperative games with Pareto efficient solutions.
IV. INVERSE COOPERATIVE DYNAMIC GAMES
In this section, we present a method to identify cost function
parameters out of trajectories describing a Pareto efficient
solution of the dynamic game. Furthermore, we prove the
unbiasedness of the estimation.
A. Preliminaries
We restrict ourselves to Pareto efficient solutions which
can be described by a global cost function given by the sum
of weighted player cost functions. One particular global cost
function is given by the sum of uniformly weighted player
cost functions defined as follows.
Definition 3. The uniformly weighted sum of all player cost
functions is given by
JΣ =
N∑
i=1
Ji =
N∑
i=1
−θ⊤i µi =: −θ
⊤
ΣµΣ (10)
with
θΣ =
[
θ⊤1 . . . θ
⊤
N
]⊤
, (11a)
and
µΣ =
[
µ⊤1 . . . µ
⊤
N
]⊤
. (11b)
We further introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 2. The cost functions Ji are convex for all i ∈ P.
Remark 1. We note that
arg min
γ
JΣ(γ) = arg min
γ
N∑
i=1
1
N
Ji(γ), (12)
where γ := {u1, . . . ,uN}, holds since multiplying any cost
function JΣ with a constant factor c ∈ R
+ (here 1/N) does
not alter the solution of the optimization problem. Therefore,
under Assumption 2, the minimizer of JΣ describes a Pareto
efficient solution of a cooperative game [33, Theorem 6.4].
B. Identification Method and Unbiasedness of the Estimation
The method is based on the maximum likelihood of the
observed trajectories under the PDF (9). Before introducing
the method, we use (10) and (11) to rewrite (9) as
p (ζ| θΣ) =
exp
(
θ⊤ΣµΣ (ζ)
)
∫
∀ζ
exp
(
θ⊤ΣµΣ(ζ)
)
dζ
. (13)
The unbiased identification of cost functions in an inverse co-
operative dynamic game is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let nt observed trajectories in D = {ζ˜1, . . . , ζ˜nt}
fulfilling Assumption 1 be available. Then, the maximum
likelihood estimator (MLE) with respect to D, i.e.
θˆΣ = arg max
θΣ
ln L{θΣ| D}
:= arg max
θΣ
ln
nt∏
l=1
p (ζ˜l | θΣ) (14)
where p (ζ˜l | θΣ) is obtained by evaluating (13) with ζ˜l,
l ∈ {1, ..., nt}, leads to a PDF for which the trajectories
yield in expectation the same accumulated costs for all players
as the trajectories corresponding to the PDF with original
parameters, i.e.
Ep( ζ|θ∗Σ)
{JΣ (ζ, θ
∗
Σ)} = Ep( ζ|θˆΣ) {JΣ (ζ, θ
∗
Σ)} . (15)
4Proof: From (14) we have
0
!
=
∂
∂θΣ
nt∑
l=1
ln p (ζ˜l | θΣ)
∣∣∣∣∣
θˆΣ
. (16)
Using the PDF of Lemma 2, this can be rewritten as
0
!
=
∂
∂θΣ
nt∑
l=1
ln

 exp
(
θ⊤ΣµΣ
(
ζ˜l
))
∫
ζ
exp
(
θ
⊤
ΣµΣ(ζ)
)
dζ


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θˆΣ
(17)
=
nt∑
l=1
∂
∂θΣ
(
−ln
(∫
ζ
exp
(
θ
⊤
ΣµΣ(ζ)
)
dζ
)
+θ⊤ΣµΣ
(
ζ˜l
))∣∣∣∣∣
θˆΣ
(18)
=
nt∑
l=1
(∫
ζ
−exp
(
θ⊤ΣµΣ(ζ)
)
µΣ(ζ)dζ∫
ζ
exp
(
θ
⊤
ΣµΣ
(
ζ
))
dζ
+ µΣ
(
ζ˜l
))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θˆΣ
(19)
Since the integrals in the numerator and the denominator in
(19) are independent of each other, (19) can be rewritten as
0
!
=
nt∑
l=1
(∫
ζ
−exp
(
θ⊤ΣµΣ(ζ)
)
µΣ(ζ)∫
ζ
exp
(
θ
⊤
ΣµΣ
(
ζ
))
dζ
dζ + µΣ
(
ζ˜l
))
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θˆΣ
. (20)
Using (13), we get
0
!
=
nt∑
l=1
(
−
∫
ζ
p (ζ| θΣ)µΣ(ζ) dζ + µΣ
(
ζ˜l
))∣∣∣∣
θˆΣ
=
nt∑
l=1
(
−Ep( ζ|θˆΣ) {µΣ(ζ)} + µΣ
(
ζ˜l
))
. (21)
From (21) and by Assumption 1 we obtain
Ep( ζ|θˆΣ) {µΣ(ζ)} =
1
nt
nt∑
l=1
µΣ
(
ζ˜l
)
(22)
= Ep( ζ|θ∗Σ)
{µΣ(ζ)} .
By the results of Lemma 1, (22) leads to (15).
Theorem 1 implies that the expectation of the global costs
(under the original parameters) produced by trajectories gen-
erated by the PDFs with original and estimated parameters
are equal. While this result is generally weaker than the one
required in (5), it is enough to describe observed trajectories
completely in cooperative games.
Remark 2. Solving (14) demands the possibility of evaluating
L{θΣ| D} and therefore the PDF (13) at the trajectories ζ˜l.
Eq. (13) includes an integral over all trajectories ζ˜ which are
feasible with respect to the system dynamics. Calculating this
integral is intractable given the continuous-valued control and
action spaces. Therefore, approximations are usually sought.
In this paper, we apply the approach introduced in [31] which
involves a quadratic approximation of the cost function evalu-
ated at the observed trajectory values. With this approach, the
unbiasedness results hold exactly for quadratic cost functions.
On the other hand, the exactness of the unbiasedness results
depends on the optimality of the observed trajectories. Thus,
if the observed trajectories correspond to an exact solution
of the dynamic game, we have exact unbiasedness since these
are also optimal with respect to the quadratic approximation.
Remark 3. Assuming that the number of features pi is known
for all i ∈ P, an individual parameter set θˆi can be determined
for each i ∈ P by means of (11a) out of the MLE θˆΣ.
Remark 4. Even though these results were derived by regard-
ing uniformly weighted player cost functions, the presented
method can also be used for explaining trajectories which
arised from the sum of cost functions which are not necessarily
equally weighted (see [33, Definition 6.1]).
V. IDENTIFICATION IN NON-COOPERATIVE NASH GAMES
We now consider non-cooperative dynamic games, where
all players act greedily and no agreements between the players
exist, leading to the Nash equilibrium solution concept.
Definition 4. An N -tuple of control sequences (u∗1, ...,u
∗
N )
constitutes a Nash equilibrium if, and only if, the inequality
Ji (u
∗
i ,u
∗
¬i, θ
∗
i ) ≤ Ji (ui,u
∗
¬i, θ
∗
i ) (23)
is satisfied for all players i ∈ P, where u¬i denotes the control
sequence of all players except player i (cf. [34, p. 266]).
In the following, we shall consider inverse problems with
open-loop (OL) and memory-less perfect state (MPS) in-
formation patterns leading to open-loop or feedback Nash
equilibrium solutions, respectively.3
A. Inverse Open-Loop Dynamic Games
We consider inverse open-loop dynamic games, where
player strategies depend only on the initial state, i.e. u
(k)
i =
γ
(k)
i (x
(1)). Similar to Section IV, we seek a suitable PDF
p(ζ) for the estimation of cost function parameters. Inspired
by [34, Theorem 6.1], where it can be discerned that the other
players’ controls do not have any direct influence on player
i’s actions, we define the PDF
p (ζ| θi) =
exp
(
θ⊤i µi(ζ)
)
∫
ζ
exp
(
θ⊤i µi(ζ)
)
dζ
(24)
which represents the probability of a particular trajectory
from the point of view of player i. This simplifies the PDF
p (ζ| θ1:N ) in such a way that N PDFs p (ζ| θi) which depend
each on each player’s cost function parameters θi, i ∈ P, are
considered instead of one single PDF which depends on all
parameters.
We introduce the following assumption which adapts As-
sumption 1 to PDFs depending only on the parameters θi of
one player i ∈ P as defined in (24).
Assumption 3. The mean of the feature count of the nt
observed trajectories gives the expectation of the trajectory
feature count resulting from (24) with θ∗i , i ∈ P, i.e.
Ep( ζ|θ∗i )
{µj(ζ)} =
1
nt
nt∑
l=1
µj
(
ζ˜l
)
, ∀i, j ∈ P. (25)
3For a feedback Nash equilibrium, a further restriction needs to be added
to (23) (see [34, Definition 6.2]). We used this definition but omitted it here
due to space restrictions.
5Furthermore, we present an alternative definition of the cost
functions.
Definition 5. Let η¯ denote an extended feature vector which
includes all features (ηi)q ∀ i ∈ P, ∀ q ∈ {1, . . . , pi} of all N
players such that (η¯)r 6= (η¯)s for all r, s ∈ {1, . . . , dim(η¯)}
and r 6= s. The extended feature count µ¯(ζ) is defined
analogously according to Definition 2. Furthermore, let the
extended parameter vector θ¯i be defined such that
Ji(ζ) = θ
⊤
i µi(ζ) = θ¯
⊤
i µ¯(ζ), ∀ i ∈ P. (26)
The following theorem gives the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. Let a set of trajectories D = {ζ˜1, . . . , ζ˜nt} be
given such that Assumption 3 is fulfilled. Then, the MLE with
respect to D, i.e.
θˆi = arg max
θi
ln L{θi| D} = arg max
θi
nt∑
l=1
ln
(
p (ζ˜l | θi)
)
,
(27)
where p (ζ˜l | θi) is obtained by evaluating (24) with ζ˜l, l ∈
{1, ..., nt}, leads to parameters θˆi such that (24) results in
an expectation of the cost function values Jj
(
ζ, θ∗j
)
, ∀j ∈ P
which is equal to the one corresponding to the PDF p (ζ| θ∗i ),
i.e.
Ep( ζ|θˆi)
{
Jj
(
ζ, θ∗j
)}
= Ep( ζ|θ∗i )
{
Jj
(
ζ, θ∗j
)}
, (28)
holds for all i, j ∈ P.
Proof: Using Definition 5, (28) can be rewritten as
E
p
(
ζ|ˆ¯θi
) {Jj (ζ, θ¯∗j )} = Ep( ζ|θ¯∗i )
{
Jj
(
ζ, θ¯∗j
)}
(29)
for all i, j ∈ P. The maximization in (27) implies
0
!
=
∂
∂θ¯i
nt∑
l=1
ln


exp
(
θ¯⊤i µ¯(ζ˜l)
)
∫
ζ
exp
(
θ¯⊤i µ¯(ζ)
)
dζ


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ¯i=
ˆ¯
θi
, (30)
where we also used (26). The rest of the proof is similar to
the proof of Theorem 1.
The results of Theorem 2 guarantee that the costs of the
estimated and the original unknown cost functions are the
same for all players, thus ensuring the fulfillment of (5) and
solving Problem 1 for open-loop dynamic games.
Remark 5. The evaluation of L{θi| D} at the trajectories ζ˜l
is done analogously to the previous section (see Remark 2).
The same holds for the results of the next subsection.
B. Inverse Feedback Nash Dynamic Games
In this section, we give solutions for inverse dynamic games
with the feedback Nash equilibrium as a solution concept.
Therefore, we consider the MPS information structure given
by u
(k)
i = γi(x
(k)).4 For the next results, the following
additional assumption is needed.
4According to [34, p. 278], the feedback Nash equilibrium solution under
the MPS information pattern solely depends on x(k) at the time step k. The
dependency on x(1) is given only for k = 1.
Assumption 4. The players’ Nash equilibrium feedback con-
trol laws γ∗i are known or can be estimated from the observed
trajectories available in D.
Remark 6. Assumption 4 is, in general, potentially restrictive.
Indeed, even the forward problem of computing feedback Nash
equilibrium strategies is difficult to solve. However, for linear-
quadratic (LQ) dynamic games with linear feedback strategies
u
∗(k)
i = γ
∗
i (x
(k)) =K∗i x
(k), (31)
with K∗i ∈ R
mi×n [33, Section 8.3], the estimation of K∗i
can easily be performed with a least-squares approach, see
e.g. [11]. A similar approach can potentially be applied for
control-affine nonlinear systems with quadratic cost functions
since the structure of the control strategy is also known in this
case (cf. [35, Lemma 1]).
If Assumption 4 holds, the control laws of the players j ∈ P,
j 6= i can be used to rewrite (1) as
x(k+1) = f (k)
(
x(k),γ∗1
(
x(k)
)
, . . . ,u
(k)
i , . . . ,γ
∗
N
(
x(k)
))
=: f
(k)
i
(
x(k),u
(k)
i
)
. (32)
In this way, it is possible for player i to represent the
system dynamics as a function of the system state x and his
own control variable ui. Analogously, the features ηi can be
rewritten as:
ηi = ηi(x
(k),u
(k)
1 , . . . ,u
(k)
N )
= ηi
(
x(k),γ∗1
(
x(k)
)
, . . . ,u
(k)
i , . . . ,γ
∗
N
(
x(k)
))
= ηi
(
x(k),u
(k)
i
)
.
(33)
Based on the representation (32) of the system dynamics from
player i’s perspective and the rewritten features (33), we state
the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let a set of trajectories D = {ζ˜1, . . . , ζ˜nt} be
given such that Assumption 3 is fulfilled. Furthermore, let
Assumption 4 hold. Then, the MLE with respect to D, i.e.
θˆi = arg max
θi
ln L{θi| D} = arg max
θi
nt∑
l=1
ln
(
p (ζ˜l | θi)
)
,
(34)
where p (ζ˜l | θi) is obtained by evaluating (24) with ζ˜l, l ∈
{1, ..., nt} and with respect to (32), leads to parameters θˆi
such that
Ep( ζ|θˆi)
{
Jj
(
ζ, θ∗j
)}
= Ep( ζ|θ∗i )
{
Jj
(
ζ, θ∗j
)}
(35)
holds for all i, j ∈ P (cf. Theorem 2).
Proof: Each Ji can be rewritten using (33). Afterwards,
the proof is the same as in Theorem 2.
VI. SIMULATION EXAMPLES
In this section, we present simulations to illustrate the in-
verse dynamic game methods. The first example is a nonlinear
dynamic game, while the second involves an LQ dynamic
game such that it is possible to calculate Nash equilibria
in order to verify the inverse feedback Nash dynamic game
solutions. We end this section with a discussion.
6M =
N∑
i=1
Mi
sx
αx
Fig. 1. Ball on beam system
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF THE BALL-ON-BEAM SYSTEM USED FOR SIMULATION
g mb rb Θb Θp
9.81m/s2 0.02 kg 25mm 5 ·10−6 kgm2 0.667 kgm2
A. Nonlinear Dynamic Game
We demonstrate the performance and compare the results of
the approach presented in Section IV for cooperative games
with Pareto efficient solutions and the method presented in
Section V-A for OL Nash equilibria. The considered system
is the well-known ball-on-beam system which is typically used
for testing nonlinear controllers (e.g. [36]), yet controlled by
two players simultaneously in this case.
The ball-on-beam system is depicted in Fig. 1. Here, αx
denotes the angle of the beam towards the horizontal. In
addition, sx represents the ball position in a beam-fixed
coordinate system. Both players interact with the system by
applying a torque ui(t) = Mi(t), i ∈ {1, 2}, with respect
to the beam’s rotational axis. Let the system state be defined
as x(t) =
[
sx(t) s˙x(t) αx(t) α˙x(t)
]⊤
. Then, the system
dynamics are described by the nonlinear differential equation
x˙ =


x2
mbr
2
b(x1x
2
4
−g sin(x3))
Θb+mbr2b
x4
−2mbx1x2x4−mbgx1 cos(x3)+u1+u2
mbx
2
1
+Θp

 , (36)
where g denotes gravity, Θp is the inertia of the beam and
rb, mb and Θb are the radius, mass and inertia of the ball,
respectively. All parameter values are given in Table I.
In the following, units are neglected as all quantities are
given in SI units. Each player acts based on an individual cost
function of the form (2), where the feature vector is given by
ηi = −
[
x21 x
2
2 x
2
3 x
2
4 u
2
i
]⊤
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. (37)
The players’ behavior is modeled by the parameters θ∗1 =[
20 1 1 1 2
]⊤
and θ∗2 =
[
1 1 10 1 1
]⊤
.
1) Cooperative Game Solution: We first assume that the
players act cooperatively. Therefore, we determine optimal
trajectories by solving an optimal control problem with the
global cost function resulting from (10), leading to
JΣ = −θ
⊤
ΣµΣ = −
[
21 2 11 2 3
]
µi. (38)
This was done by applying Pontryagin’s minimum principle
and solving the resulting two-point boundary value problem
TABLE II
IDENTIFIED PARAMETERS IN THE NONLINEAR DYNAMIC GAME
θ1
* [20.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.000]
NOLN [19.697 0.915 2.350 0.643 2.000]
CG [10.116 1.207 0.601 1.317 2.000]
θ2
* [1.000 1.000 10.000 1.000 1.000]
NOLN [1.027 1.010 9.965 1.026 1.000]
CG [10.117 1.203 0.601 1.311 1.000]
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Fig. 2. State and control trajectories used for identification (cooperative game
and open-loop Nash solution) and corresponding trajectories generated from
identified parameters
(TPBVP). Using the initial state x(1) =
[
0.5 0 0 0
]⊤
, we
obtain the observed trajectories ζ˜CG of the cooperative game
(CG) solution.
2) Non-Cooperative Open-Loop Game Solution: Similar to
the CG solution, we apply Pontryagin’s minimum principle
and then solve the resulting TPBVP to determine the OL Nash
equilibrium trajectories. The OL Nash equilibrium exists and
is unique since the conditions of [37, Lemma 4.2] are fulfilled.
Using the same initial state x(1) as before, we obtain the
observed ζ˜NOLN corresponding to the (nonlinear) open-loop
Nash equilibrium (NOLN).
3) Inverse Dynamic Game Solutions: In order to solve the
inverse dynamic games corresponding to the Pareto and OL
Nash solution concepts, the system was discretized using a
sampling time ∆T = 0.02 s. The MLE (14) was calculated
with the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method
and the approach in Remark 3 was applied to obtain the
estimations θˆ
(CG)
i . Similarly, (27) was solved to obtain the
estimated parameters θˆ
(NOLN)
i . All resulting parameters are
given in Table II. These were used to generate estimated
trajectories ζˆCG and ζˆNOLN. All four sets of trajectories are
depicted in Fig 2. Error measures are given in Section VI-C.
7TABLE III
IDENTIFIED PARAMETERS IN THE LQ DYNAMIC GAME
θ1
* [20.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.000]
LOLN [19.360 0.950 1.379 0.903 2.000]
FB [19.421 1.002 −0.375 1.017 2.000]
θ2
* [1.000 1.000 10.000 1.000 1.000]
LOLN [0.640 0.928 9.531 0.962 1.000]
FB [0.531 0.885 9.113 0.988 1.000]
B. Linear-Quadratic Dynamic Game
We now consider an LQ dynamic game to evaluate our ap-
proach in case of feedback (FB) Nash equilibria and compare
it to the OL case. The cost functions Ji, i ∈ {1, 2} have a
form according to (2) and quadratic features given by (37).
In order to obtain linear system dynamics, we linearize (36)
around x(t) = 0, leading to
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +B1u1(t) +B2u2(t) (39)
where
A =


0 1 0 0
0 0
−r2bmbg
Θb+mbr2b
0
0 0 0 1
−mbg
Θp
0 0 0

 , Bi =


0
0
0
1
Θp

 , (40)
i ∈ {1, 2}. Both parameter vectors θ∗1 and θ
∗
2 remain un-
changed with respect to the previous example.
1) Non-Cooperative Game Solution: Using the ground truth
cost function parameters, the feedback Nash equilibrium tra-
jectories ζ˜FB are calculated by means of the coupled matrix
Riccati equations [33, Theorem 8.5]. In order to give a com-
parison to another solution concept, we also calculate (linear)
open-loop Nash (LOLN) equilibrium trajectories ζ˜LOLN (based
on (39)) analogously [33, Theorem 7.13]. Both theorems allow
to confirm the Nash character of the trajectories given the
stability of the controlled system.
2) Inverse Dynamic Game Solutions: We discretize (39)
using a sampling time ∆T = 0.02 s. Furthermore, for the FB
Nash dynamic game, we previously estimated K∗i for both
players using a least-squares approach based on (31) and the
observed trajectories ζ˜FB. Finally, the resulting optimization
problem (27) is solved with the BFGS method for both the
OL and FB Nash cases. The identified parameters are given
in Table III. These are used to determine the estimated trajec-
tories ζˆLOLN and ζˆFB. The observed and estimated trajectories
are depicted in Fig. 3.
C. Performance with Noisy Measurements
We now consider the case where measurements are imper-
fect. Gaussian noise is added to the states and controls to
simulate noisy measurements x˜l(t) = xl(t)+ǫl, ∀l ∈ {1, ..., n}
and u˜i,k(t) = ui,k(t) + ǫi,k, ∀k ∈ {1, ...,mi}, ∀i ∈ P. Here,
x(t) and ui(t), i ∈ P stand for perfect observations of either
Pareto efficient, OL or FB Nash equilibrium trajectories. The
Gaussian noise is chosen such that all signals have a particular
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). We use different SNR levels for
the evaluation. The performance of the methods is analyzed
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Fig. 3. State and control trajectories used for identification (open-loop
and feedback Nash solution) and corresponding trajectories generated from
identified parameters
using the normalized maximum absolute error (NMAE) of the
trajectories ea = max {eaj } with
eaj =
∥∥∥∥ aˆj(t)− aj(t)‖aj(t)‖max
∥∥∥∥
max
, (41)
where a ∈ {x,ui} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} or j ∈ {1, ...,mi}
depending on whether state or controls are considered. We
further consider eu = max {eui} for the controls. The results
are given in Table IV. We denote with SNR =∞ the case in
which no noise is added to all signals.
D. Discussion
We observe in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 that the methods are able
to determine cost function parameters which correctly explain
the observed trajectories. For the CG case, we discern that the
equally weighted sum associated to the identified individual
parameters resembles the ground truth global cost function JΣ.
The correct approximation of the trajectories indicate that the
identified parameters belong to the same Pareto frontier as the
ground truth parameters. In addition, the individual parameters
are almost equal for all common features (all except u2i ) since
the maximum entropy principle does not favour any player.
The identification of the CG solution described by the
global cost function is robust to measurement noise. The other
methods’ results deteriorate for signals with an SNR < 20dB.
Furthermore, this effect grows with an increased number of
maximum likelihood estimations in inverse Nash dynamic
games.
VII. CONCLUSION
We developed methods for inverse dynamic games based
on MaxEnt IRL, treating three different solution concepts and
8TABLE IV
NMAE RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT SNR LEVELS
SNR 15 dB 20 dB 25 dB 30 dB ∞
CG
ex 0.017 0.015 0.009 0.010 0.010
eu 0.016 0.017 0.005 0.006 0.003
NOLN
ex 0.041 0.019 0.009 0.005 0.003
eu 0.614 0.288 0.089 0.050 0.014
LOLN
ex 0.055 0.036 0.022 0.017 0.012
eu 1.046 0.375 0.319 0.016 0.004
FB
ex 0.359 0.301 0.071 0.025 0.013
eu 0.998 0.382 0.144 0.032 0.032
presenting unbiasedness results for case. The performance of
the methods was shown using examples of nonlinear and
LQ dynamic games. Our methods allow for cost function
identification in dynamic games to obtain a model of the
players based on observed data. This can be done either by
a centralized approach or by the agents themselves in case
complete trajectory sets can be determined. For a more effi-
cient application of these approaches, methods for the online
computation of the likelihood function based on potentially
incomplete trajectory sets are yet to be investigated in future
work.
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